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Abstract
All international trade involves the shipment of commodities from one nation to another.
Many commodities, before reaching their final destinations, are transshipped through
several nations, each having independent authorities to tax commodities in transit.
However, we show that such “middle” nations may be unable to exercise monopoly
power over commodities in transit and all the rents are captured by the country where the
commodities are produced and the country where there are markets.
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The ancient civilizations of China and the Mediterranean were connected by the
legendary Silk Road, the nearly 5, 000-mile-long trade route that meandered through
many areas of influence, in which the independent nation states exacted tolls from
traveling merchants. Analyzing a game-theoretic model of such trade routes, Karni and
Chakrabarti (1997) found that the nation states collectively suffer from the double
marginalization problem, so unification of them into one empire, such as achieved under
the Mongols, leads to more trade and tax revenues. Gardner, Gaston and Masson (2002)
reached similar conclusions in their theoretical analysis of cargo shipments down the
medieval Rhine when local barons constructed castles along the river to exact tolls for the
right of passage.
As  these  examples  vividly  illustrate,  in  market  economies  trade  between
producers and consumers of the products involve successive layers of intermediaries.
Manufactures and farm produce are sold to wholesalers and then to retailers before
reaching final consumers. Oil and natural gas are transported through pipelines across
foreign countries, which demand user fees. Other examples include telephone calls
involving local and long-distance or international telephone service providers, and
vacation trips consisting of hub-to-hub flights by one carrier and local flights by another.
In each of these cases, the double marginalization problem can arise when more than one
intermediary have monopoly power over the commodities in transit. As is well known,
however, the problem can be mitigated if two or more in a chain of monopolies are
vertically integrated to coordinate prices. Furthermore, vertical integration is known to be
socially desirable as the price is lowered and output increased.2
As  Feinberg  and  Kamien  (2001)  have  pointed  out,  however,  the  double
marginalization problem arises from the implicit assumption that prices and tolls charged
by concatenated monopolies are pre-committed to before transactions take place. This
indeed was the assumption made in the works of Karni and Chakrabarti (1997) and
Gardner et al. (2002). Feinberg and Kamien (2001) have shown that, if trade occurs
sequentially,  the  lack  of  commitment  leads  to  the  disappearance  of  the  double
marginalization problem; however, the economy will instead suffer from the holdup
problem. To see this, consider a simple example from Feinberg and Kamien (2001).
Suppose that a merchant travels the road to deliver his ware to the market. The road goes
through two domains. Suppose that the merchant, having crossed the first domain, arrives
at the second. Assume that the merchandise loses its value unless delivered to the market
located at the end of the road. Then, if the lord of the second domain taxes the entire
market value of the merchandise in exchange for the right of passage through its territory,
then the merchant, whether he accedes to the demand or discontinues the journey, loses
the  value  of  his  merchandise,  and  hence  is  indifferent  between  the  two  options.
Therefore, if the tax is slightly lowered, the merchant will pay it and cross the second
domain to deliver the merchandise to the market. This way, the lord of the second domain
can collect nearly the entire value of the merchandise.
However, a forward-looking merchant may anticipate the taxing strategy of the
second domain. Since he loses all his value, once having reached the second country, the
merchant will not embark on a journey unless he can cross the first domain tax-free. The
conclusion: when trade occurs the second domain captures the entire value of the
merchandise (monopoly rent) while the first domain as well as the merchant earn zero3
rent. Since only the second domain exercises monopoly power, there is no double
marginalization problem. Furthermore, social welfare is greater than when the two
domains commit to the taxes before the merchant embarks on a journey.
The above conclusion however hinges on the assumption that there are no trade
costs. Should the merchant incur costs hauling his ware to the market, or should the first
domain incur administrative costs, they will be unable to cover these costs and hence
trade ceases.
In this paper we argue that the hold-up problem intimated in the Feinberg-Kamien
analysis is a consequence of the assumption that the game is played only once. Although
one can think of real-world examples in which games are played just once, many
transactions are repeated. In this paper we analyze a model of infinitely repeated
transactions, and find that trade thrives despite the presence of trade costs. Moreover, the
equilibrium price is lower than when monopolists contract on prices in a one-period
game, but higher than when all the monopolists are integrated into a single monopoly.
Interestingly, an integration of subsets of monopolists does not lower the equilibrium
price or increase joint profits unless both the first and the last monopolists are members
of the integration.
The intuition underlying these results is as follows. In a repeated-game setting, the
last monopoly can always act myopically, exacting the value of the commodity when the
merchant arrives to his domain in the manner described in the one-period play. However,
under the assumed trigger strategy the merchant will never embark on another journey in
the future once he suffers financial losses so that the last monopoly’s future profit
becomes zero. The last monopoly instead can lower the tax enough to guarantee the4
return of the merchants in the future periods. If this alternative strategy yields a greater
discounted sum of revenues than the one-time monopoly rent, the last monopoly has an
incentive to lower taxes, and trade occurs in the future. In this paper we investigate the
nature of such an equilibrium outcome.
When there are more than two monopolies in a succession, we show that the
entire value of the merchandise is shared between the first and the last monopoly. The
reason for the failure of all the “middle” monopolists to capture any rent despite their
monopoly positions over commodities in transit is as follows. What makes the last
monopoly act myopically or patiently is the sum of taxes the merchants paid before
getting there. If this sum is sufficiently high, the last monopoly has to set his tax
significantly lower to ensure the return of the merchant, which makes acting myopically
more attractive. We show that there is indeed a threshold level of sum of taxes collected
by all the monopolies before the last. If the actual sum of taxes the merchant paid exceeds
this threshold the last monopoly acts myopically, thereby ending future trade. Since no
trade means no future revenues for all the monopolies, it is in the best interest of all the
rest of the monopolists to keep this sum below or equal to the threshold to ensure future
trade. But then the first monopolist capitalizes on a first-mover advantage, setting his tax
equal to the threshold, which leaves no rent to the middle monopolists. Thus, the first and
the last monopolists exact the entire value of the merchandise.
The remainder of the paper is organized in four sections. The next section revisits
the Feinberg-Kamien model. Section 3 extends the model to cases of repeated interplays.
Section 4 extends the model further to a case of multiple road segments. The final section
concludes.5
2. The one-period game
In this section we study the one-period game, which serves as the stage game of
the  dynamic  model  to  be  considered  bellow.  Merchants  produce  and  sell  their
merchandise in the market. To reach the market the merchants must travel across two
countries in a given order. Let x denote the number of merchants, a real number, to
simplify  the  exposition.  Choose  units  so  that  each  merchant  delivers  one  unit  of
merchandise to the market. Thus, x also denotes quantity of the product. Market (inverse)
demand is given by p(x), a differentiable function with respect to x > 0, with first and
second derivatives denoted by p’(x) < 0 and p”(x) ≤ 0.
Consider the following four-stage game.
Stage 1: The first country announces a tax t1 ≥ 0.
Stage 2: Observing t1, all the merchants simultaneously decide whether to cross the
first country or not.
Stage 3: After the merchants have crossed the first, the second country posts a tax rate
t2 ≥ 0.
Stage 4: Observing t2, the merchants decide whether to cross the second country.
Each country’s payoff per period is the net tax revenue it collects from the merchants (the
difference between the total taxes collected and the total cost incurred), where country i
incurs costs ci (i = 1, 2) per merchant crossing its territory (ci ≥ 0). A merchant’s payoff
per period is the difference between the market price of the commodity (zero in case of
non-delivery) and the sum of taxes he has paid. All the taxes become sunk after they are
paid. We normalize each merchant’s default payoff to zero, and adopt the tie-breaking6
rule that a merchant sets out on a journey as long as he expects a non-negative payoff.
Finally, we assume that p(0) > c1 + c2, so delivery of the commodity to the market is
socially desirable.
We solve the game backwards. Let x1 be the number of merchants who, having
crossed the first territory, arrive at the second. Then, observing t2, each merchant reasons
as follows. If he crosses the second country and expects x2 (≤ x1) other merchants to do
the same, his payoff will be p(x2) – t2 – t1. On the other hand, if he does not, his payoff
will be  – t1, the first tax payment that is sunk. Therefore, a merchant goes forward if and
only if
p(x2) – t2 – t1 ≥ – t1
or
(1) p(x2) – t2 ≥ 0.
In the third stage of the game, country 2 chooses t2 to maximize the net tax
revenue (t2  –  c2)x2  subject to the constraint (1) and x2  ≤  x1. Ignoring the second
inequality for the moment, maximization of the Lagrangian
(t2 – c2)x2  + λ[p(x2) – t2]
yields the optimality conditions
t2 – c2  + λp’(x2) = 0; and x2 - λ = 0,
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier. The two equations above combine to yield
(2) p(x2) – c2 + p’(x2)x2 = 0,7
which is the standard first-order condition for a monopolist facing demand p(x) and
constant marginal cost c2. Given the assumption on p(x), (2) has a unique solution,
denoted by x
m
2 . The (maximum) monopoly rent to country 2 equals
π
m
2  ≡ [p(x
m
2 ) – c2]x
m
2 .
Substituting into the constraint equation from (1), we obtain country 2’s optimal tax rate:
t
m
2  = p(x
m
2 ).
Now return to the constraint x2 ≤ x1 that we have ignored. Suppose that x
m
2  < x1.
Then, if all x1 merchants paid the tax t
m
2  = p(x
m
2 ) and crossed the second country, the
payoff to each merchant will be p(x1) – p(x
m
2 ) – t1 which is less than – t1. Therefore, not
all merchants will cross the second country to reach the market. In equilibrium, the
merchants have rational expectations so that exactly x
m
2  merchants cross the second
country while x1 – x
m
2
  do not. However, each merchant, regardless of his or her choice,
has the same payoff of  – t1.
Suppose alternatively that x1 ≤ x
m
2 .  Then, the left-hand side of (2) is strictly
positive at x1 < x
m
2 . Therefore, the optimal tax is t2 = p(x1), implying all the merchants x1
cross the second country, but again they all earn or suffer exactly the same loss, – t1. To
sum, country 2’s optimal strategy is t2 = p(x1) if x1 ≤ x
m
2  and t2 = p(x
m
2 ) if x1 > x
m
2 .
Given country 2’s optimal strategy, once they have crossed the first territory, the
merchants earn the negative rent, – t1, regardless of whether they cross the second or not.8
Therefore, the merchants will embark on the journeys only if t1 = 0. But country 1 is
willing to charge t1 = 0 only if c1 = 0. Thus:
Proposition 1: In a one-period game trade takes place only if c1 = 0, in which case
country 2 captures the monopoly rent while country  1 captures no rent through taxation.
3. Repeated interactions
Suppose that the players play the above game repeatedly an infinite number of
periods. Each merchant makes one delivery per period. While no trade is still a possible
equilibrium outcome under the conditions considered in the previous section, there is an
alternative equilibrium outcome in which trade occurs. In this section we examine the
properties of such an equilibrium outcome.
Assume that each merchant adopts the following strategy. In the first period he
decides to embark on a journey. In any subsequent period, he sets out on a new journey if
and only if he has never suffered losses on any of his previous journeys.
We next specify the equilibrium strategies of two countries that result in trade.
We look for a stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome with the following
characteristics. In each period the constant number x* of merchants embark on journeys,
and the countries demand the taxes t1* and t2*. We assume that x* ≤ x
m
2 , and justify this
assumption shortly.
We first show that the second country’s optimal tax is t2 = p(x*) – t1. For, if t2 <
p(x*) – t1, the merchants would earn positive profits, which the second country can exact9
by raising the tax to p(x*) – t1. If p(x*) > t2 > p(x*) – t1 all the x* merchants will cross
the second territory but suffer losses, p(x*) – t1 – t2 < 0, and hence they will never travel
in the future. Finally, if t2 > p(x*), a fraction, say, x2, of the x* merchants will cross the
second country and deliver the merchandise, where x2 is given by t2 = p(x) while the
remainder, i.e., x* - x2, of the merchants will choose not to complete their journeys. In
this case, however, all x* merchants will receive the negative profit – t1 and will never
come back. Thus, t2 = p(x*) – t1 is the only tax consistent with the equilibrium outcome
in which there is trade in every period.
Therefore, the equilibrium net revenue per period to the second country is [p(x*)
– t1 - c2]x*. Adding up over periods leads to the discounted sum of profits:
v2 = [p(x*) – t1 – c2]x*/(1 - δ)
where δ  ∈(0, 1) is the (common) discount factor. For t2  =  p(x*)  –  t1  to  hold  in
equilibrium, the second country must not have the temptation to act myopically, that is,
set the tax at p(x*) to exact the entire value of the merchandise. Since this myopic
behavior yields the one-time profit of [p(x*) – c2]x* and no future profits, the no-myopic
behavior condition is met if:
v2 = [p(x*) – t1 – c2]x*/(1 – δ) ≥ [p(x*) – c2]x*,
which simplifies to:
t1 ≤ δ[p(x*) – c2].
The above condition then yields country 2’s best responses to t1 as follows:10
(3) t2 = p(x*) – t1 if t1 ≤ δ[p(x*) – c2]
t2 = p(x*) if t1 > δ[p(x*) – c2]
Turning to the behavior of the merchants, suppose that t1 < δ[p(x*) – c2]. Then
the merchants expect the tax t2 = p(x*) – t1, once they cross the first country. If a small
group of additional merchants (of size ε > 0) decide also to cross the first country,
country 2 will adjust the tax to t2 = p(x* + ε) – t1 as long as t1 ≤ δ[p(x* + ε) – c2]. Then,
all x* + ε merchants journey to the market, thereby disturbing the candidacy of x* as the
equilibrium number of merchants who travel. On the other hand, if t1 > δ[p(x*) – c2],
country 2 will act myopically. Thus, in the equilibrium, we must have:
(4) t1 = δ[p(x*) – c2].
This equation defines a mapping from t1 to x*.
Now, consider country 1, which sets t1 to maximize the net tax revenue per
period, (t1  –  c1)x*, where x* is determined by t1  via (4). It is more convenient to
substitute from (4) and restate its problem as:
Maxx* {δ[p(x*) – c2] – c1}x*.
The first-order condition is
(5) δ[p(x*) – c2] – c1 + δx*p’(x*) = 0,
which implicitly determines the equilibrium number of merchants x* who choose to
travel. Evaluated at x
m
2 , the left-hand side of (5) is negative, implying x* < x
m
2 . This
justifies our focus on x* ≤ x
m
2 .11
The optimal tax rate for country 1 is
(6) t1* = δ[p(x*) – c2].
By (5) and (6)
t1* – c1 = δ[p(x*) – c2] – c1 = – δx*p’(x*) > 0,
guaranteeing a strictly positive profit for country 1. The optimal tax for country 2, t2*,
obtains from substituting for t1* from (6) into (3), and is reported in the next proposition.
Proposition 2: In the stationary equilibrium with two nation states
(A) the number x* of merchants who journey solves (5), and x* < x
m
2 ;
(B) the optimal tax for two countries are
t1* = δ[p(x*) – c2],
t2* = (1 - δ)p(x*) + δc2, and
(C) both countries earn positive net tax revenues.
The intuition for Result 2.C has been given in the introduction but it will be useful
to explain it in terms of the model we have just seen. If the tax the merchants paid to
country 1 is not too high, country 2 can collect sufficiently large tax revenues. If the sum
of such revenues over the long haul exceeds the payoff from the myopic action, country 2
will prefer that trade continues; otherwise it will act myopically. Then, country 1 can
raise its tax high enough to make country 2 indifferent between the two options, thereby
collecting positive net tax revenues.12
In sum, in contrast to the one-period game of Section 2, repeated interplays give
rise to trade despite the presence of trade cost, leading to the strictly positive payoffs for
both countries. What if there are fewer than x* merchants who are willing to travel?
Suppose that there are only x0 potential merchants (where x0 < x*). In this case, the
proposition still holds, as can easily be confirmed, with x0 replacing x* in Results 2.A
and 2.B.
4. Many nations states
This section extends the above analysis to the case in which the trade route goes
through more than two countries. A case of three countries is sufficient to capture the
essential features of such extensions. Look again for stationary equilibrium strategies that
induce the same number of merchants to embark on journeys every period.
Assume that country 3 controls the third and final segment of the trade route, with
unit cost c3, while country 2 is now the middle monopoly. Let
x
m
3  ≡ argmax [p(x) – c3]x, and
π
m
3  ≡ [p(x
m
3 ) – c3]x
m
3
denote, respectively, the optimal output and the maximum profit from acting myopically.
Then, a procedure similar to the one employed in the previous section establishes the
following best responses for country 3:
(7) t3 = p(x*) – t1 – t2 if t1  + t2 ≤ δ[px*) – c3]
t2 = p(x*) if t1  + t2 > δ[p(x*) – c3],13
where x* again denotes the (yet undetermined) number of merchants who travel the
entire trade route in the equilibrium. The conditions in (7) indicate that the sum of the
first two taxes holds the key to whether country 3 acts myopically or not.
Turning to country 2, which now controls the middle segment of the trade route,
suppose that, observing x* merchants crossing the first country, country 2 posts t2 >
δ[p(x*) – c3] – t1. Then, the merchants infer from (7) that, once having traversed the
second country, country 3 will act myopically. The merchant’s net income then would be
– (t1 + t2), whereas he can earn the income – t1 by abandoning the journey without
crossing the second country. Thus, no merchants would cross the second country,
yielding zero revenue to country 2. On the other hand, if t2 < δ[p(x*) – c3] – t1 country 2
can raise the tax up to δ[p(x*) – c3] – t1 without triggering myopic behavior from country
3. Thus, the equilibrium tax for country 2 is
(8) t2* =  δ[p(x*) – c3] – t1.
Finally, to be optimal, t2* must give country 2 a non-negative payoff; i.e.,
(9) δ[p(x*) – c3] – t1 ≥ c2.
Now, turning to country 1, we show that, if all the x* merchants pay t1 and
embark on journeys, x* must satisfy (9) with strict equality: i.e., 
(10) t1 = δ[p(x*) – c3] – c2.
If t1 is strictly less than the right-hand side of (10), more merchants are willing to travel,
disturbing the equilibrium in which x* merchants travel repeatedly. Eq. (10) then defines
a mapping from t1 to x*.14
Country 1’s problem is now stated: choose t1 to maximize the net income (t1 –
c1)x* subject to (10). Using (10), the first-order condition is written:
(11) δ[p(x*) + x*p’(x*) – c3] – c2 – c1 = 0,
which defines x*. The left-hand side of (11) is negative at x
m
3 , implying x* < x
m
3 . By (10)
the optimal tax is
(12) t1* = δ[p(x*) – c3] – c2.
(11) and (12) imply
t1* – c1 = δ[p(x*) – c3] – c2 – c1  = - δx*p’(x*) > 0
yielding a strictly positive net revenue for country 1. Substituting from (12) into (8)
shows, however, that t2* = c2. Thus, net tax revenue is zero for country 2. Further
substitution shows a positive payoff for country 3.
Proposition 3: The model with three countries has a stationary equilibrium, in which
(A) x* merchants set out on journeys every period, where x* is determined by (11),
(B) the optimal tax rates for country i = 1, 2, 3 are
t1* = δ[p(x*) – c3] –  c2,
t2* = c2
t3* = (1 - δ)p(x*) + δc3, so that
(C) only countries 1 and 3 earn strictly positive rents per period.15
What is perhaps most striking about this proposition is the fact that country 2
breaks even despite the monopoly position over the middle segment of the trade route
through which all the merchants must travel. This result has the follow explanation. State
3 chooses the myopic action over the equilibrium long-term action unless the sum of two
taxes the merchants paid are sufficiently low. Then, country 1 can take advantage of his
first-mover position to set his tax just high enough to make country 3 indifferent between
the myopic and the long-term equilibrium strategy. But that leaves no margin for
exploitation of the merchants by country 2. If state 2 sets the tax higher than its cost, no
merchants will travel over its territory.
The next proposition generalizes Proposition 3 (the proof is similar and omitted).
Proposition 4: The model of N (> 2) segmented roads has a stationary equilibrium, in
which the optimal tax rates are
t1* = δ[p(x*) – cN] –   ck k=2
N−1 ∑ ,
tk* = ck;  k = 2, …., N – 1,
tN* = (1 - δ)p(x*) + δcN,
where x*, the equilibrium number of merchants, is the solution to
δ[p(x) + xp’(x) – cN] –  ck k=1
N−1 ∑  = 0.
5. Concluding remarks
All international trade involves the shipment of commodities from one nation to
another. Many commodities, before reaching their final destinations, are transshipped16
through several nations, each with independent tax authorities. We find that, if trade
continues over time, only the nation states occupying the first and the last segment of the
trade route can extract the monopoly rent through taxation, while those in the middle
cannot, unless they develop sufficient demand for the commodities for themselves.
Our analysis leads to the following speculation. The Silk Road benefited only the
Chinese and the Roman Empire as they controlled the beginning and the end of the trade
route, while the other nation states failed to capture any profit from traveling merchants.
Similar fates may haunt the present-day nations in like positions. For example, Egypt and
Panama, despite their unique positions to control the bulk of world trade, seem unable to
exploit their monopoly power. Similarly, countries, though which the pipelines carry oil
and natural gas to the final destinations, seem unable to capture much of the monopoly
rent.17
Appendix
We show that the model of Section 3 has no stationary equilibrium in which the number
of merchants who travel is greater than x2
m. Suppose that such an equilibrium exists so
that x* ≥ x
m
2 . Then, the optimal tax for country 2 is t2 = p(x*) – t1. If it behaves
myopically, country 2 would set the tax equal to p(x
m
2 ) instead of p(x*) to earn the
monopoly rent π
m
2  defined in Section 2. Country 2 has no incentive to behave myopically
if
[p(x*) – t1 – c2]x*/(1 – δ) ≥ π2
m.
This condition simplifies to
t1 ≤ p(x*) – c2 – (1 – δ)π
m
2 /x*
In the equilibrium we have
t1 = p(x*) – c2 – (1 – δ)π
m
2 /x*.
This equation maps from t1 to the equilibrium x*. Country 1 chooses t1 to maximize the
net tax collection. Equivalently, it chooses x* to maximize
(t1 – c1)x* = [p(x*) – c2 – c1]x* – (1 – δ)π2
m
The x* therefore fulfils the first-order condition:
p(x*) – c2 – c1 + x*p’(x*) = 0.
Evaluated at x
m
2 , the left-hand side of the above equation is negative, implying x* < x2
m.
This contradicts our initial assumption.❏18
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